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Abstract
To increase transparency of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations, the European Com-
mission has reformed existing information sharing systems for trade policy. The Commission has moved from a strategy
of providing transparency in the form of access to documents to one of access to information, geared specifically towards
enhancing consumption of the available information. In both public and institutional transparency policy, the width of the
target audience and the depth of the information have increased, and the manner of provision has shifted from reactive
to proactive provision of information. As a result, the TTIP is now being coined as the most transparent trade negotiation
ever in the EU’s history and a pilot project for transparency policy in future trade negotiations. The article adopts a supply-
centred perspective to explain a transparency policy that goes beyond the legal minimum imposed by formal requirements.
It relies on interview data of the changes brought about in inter-institutional relations since 2014, basic quantitative and
qualitative analysis of document material, and a five-month participatory observation by the author in the secretariat of
the European Parliament’s Committee on International Trade.
Keywords
access to documents; common commercial policy; European Commission; European Parliament; information; negotiation;
trade; transparency; TTIP
Issue
This article is part of the issue “EU Institutional Politics of Secrecy and Transparency in Foreign Affairs”, edited by Vigjilenca
Abazi and Johan Adriaensen (Maastricht University, The Netherlands).
© 2017 by the author; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
Since 2014, the European Commission (henceforth Com-
mission) has been reforming existing information shar-
ing systems to increase transparency of the negotia-
tions for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partner-
ship (TTIP) (Cremona, 2015). The Commission has also
explicitly stated that these practices will become the
new rationale for future trade negotiations (European
Commission, 2015b). Literature on EU trade policy as-
sesses transparency from the perspective of the demand-
side, either based on Access to Documents legislation—
public transparency—or by analysing Inter-Institutional
Agreements—institutional transparency (Devuyst, 2013;
Hillebrandt & Abazi, 2015; Jančić, 2016; Kleimann, 2011;
Meissner, 2016; see also Gheyle & De Ville, 2017; Rosén &
Stie, 2017, in this issue). So far there has not been any com-
prehensive effort to map and analyse changes in trans-
parency policy from the perspective of the supply-side—
i.e. the Commission. Hence, a supply-centred analysis of
the Commission’s motivations for and methods of provid-
ing transparency offers a novel perspective to this debate.
This article gives an overview of the changes in the
Commission’s transparency regime for trade policy since
the start of the TTIP negotiationsmid-2013 until the natu-
ral pause after the United States (US) elections in Novem-
ber 2016. The period is inductively generated from the
case study, as the end date is chosen at a time where the
transparency practices are sufficiently consolidated and
not much further change is expected. The analysis will
discuss the changes in public transparency policy, as well
as changes in institutional transparency and document—
Politics and Governance, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 3, Pages 29–39 29
and information-sharing at the EU level.1 For the latter,
the Commission–European Parliament (henceforth Par-
liament) axis will be the primary focus, as it is here that
most post-TTIP innovation has taken place.2 The analy-
sis shows how the provision of transparency can gener-
ate procedural changes and impact inter-institutional re-
lationships (see also Abazi & Adriaensen, 2017, in this
issue). In addition, this study contributes to the debate
around accountability and democratic deficit in EU pol-
icy making, as it shows the importance of qualitative
changes for the consumption of information.
The data consists of interviewmaterial and participa-
tory observation by the author in the secretariat of the
Parliamentary Committee for International Trade (hence-
forth INTA).3 This is supplemented by an analysis of docu-
ment material consisting of memos, guidelines, or train-
ingmaterial for staff on record creation and keeping, and
on the processing of access to information requests; doc-
uments that refer to creation and keeping of agendas,
lists of meetings, minutes of meetings, lists of partici-
pants in meetings, and documents justifying decisions;
and institutional documents containing rules and proce-
dures for inter-institutional information-sharing. The fol-
lowing section gives an overview of the existing scholarly
work about transparency in the EU and identifies where
this article may provide additional insights. The third sec-
tion introduces the conceptual framework guiding the
empirical analysis, which is set out in the fourth section.
The conclusion reflects on these findings and proposes
new questions for further study.
2. State of the Art
Literature on transparency in the EU has predominantly
portrayed the Commission and the Council of Minis-
ters (henceforth Council)—and more recently the Euro-
pean Council—as reluctant to provide the requested in-
formation out of concern for ‘space to think’ and ef-
ficiency of the decision-making process (Curtin, 2014;
Hillebrandt&Novak, 2016). The focus has predominantly
been on Council proceedings, driven by the reforms in-
troduced by Regulation 1049/2001 on access to docu-
ments and a perceived power shift towards the Council
and the European Council in EU politics (Curtin, 2014).
Several studies have analysed the institutional drivers of
Council transparency policies (Bjurulf & Elgström, 2004;
Hillebrandt, Curtin, & Meijer, 2014). In addition, schol-
ars have assessed the impact of changes in Council
transparency policies on its inter-institutional bargain-
ing power. Premised on informational asymmetry arising
from different degrees of transparency, there may be a
negative correlation between the level of transparency
an institution is required to provide and that institution’s
leverage in inter-institutional negotiations (Hillebrandt &
Novak, 2016; Meijer, 2013).4
More specific literature on EU trade policy assesses
transparency from the perspective of the demand-
side, either based on Access to Documents legislation—
public transparency—or by analysing Inter-Institutional
Agreements—institutional transparency. These studies
tend to place the Commission on the defensive and at
the losing end of the spectrum, reluctantly forced to
provide more transparency by an increasingly assertive
public opinion and powerful Parliament (Devuyst, 2013;
Hillebrandt & Abazi, 2015; Jančić, 2016; Kleimann, 2011;
Meissner, 2016; Rosén & Stie, 2017, this issue).
Yet both strands of literature remain silent about
what can explain a transparency policy that goes beyond
the legal minimum imposed by Treaty and case law or
by formal requirements enacted in institutional agree-
ments (like the one that we have seen developing in the
case of TTIP). This article contributes to the literature on
transparency in EU external trade policy from a supply-
centred perspective: why does the Commission to pro-
vide transparency if itmight reduce its bargaining power?
And more specifically, why does it go beyond the legally
required minimum when doing so?
Previous research on inter-institutional cooperation
between Commission and Council in EU trade negotia-
tions has found that the Commission may on its own
initiative choose to provide institutional transparency
and thereby balance informational asymmetries to pre-
empt negotiation failure at the ratification stage (Core-
mans & Kerremans, 2017). With the Parliament as a new
powerful player in external trade policy since 2009, I ex-
pect the Commission as the external negotiator to at-
tach more importance to coordination with the Parlia-
ment for international negotiations, compared to the
pre-Lisbon situation—as the number and power of inter-
nal stakeholders has increased (Winham, 1979). Taking
into account previous experience with failed ratification
in the case of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement,
such coordination could prove vital for the Commission
to anticipate the reaction of Parliament to the negoti-
ation outcome: ‘since the EP might kill the agreement
in the end, listening to their demands is common sense’
1 The analysis refrains from detailing the legislative framework for transparency policy and inter-institutional coordination for international agreements,
as this has been done elsewhere (Devuyst, 2013, 2015; European Parliament, 2015a; Leino, 2014).
2 Relations between the Commission and the Council on trade negotiations have not changed significantly with the TTIP negotiations, and will therefore
not be covered in this article (See Coremans & Kerremans, 2017).
3 9 interviews were conducted between November 2015 and May 2016 with Commission, Council, and Parliament officials. The respondents were se-
lected based on their function within the institutions, which means officials from Directorate-General for Trade within the Commission (DG Trade),
Parliament officials involved the INTA Committee, and officials from the Council’s Directorate for Trade. In terms of substance, the interviews covered
pre-Lisbon and current working practices regarding the negotiation of multi- and bilateral trade agreements, as well as the current transparency policy.
Answers were cross-referenced between officials of different institutions. The participatory observation consisted of an unpaid Schuman traineeship in
the INTA secretariat fromOctober 2016 to February 2017. Clarifications and factual corrections were obtained via follow-up contacts with respondents.
4 Still the question remains in how far formal transparency requirements reflect the true level of informational asymmetry between institutions (Adri-
aensen & Coremans, 2017; Coremans & Kerremans, 2017).
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(Rosén, 2016, p. 9, emphasis original; see also Devuyst,
2013; Dür &Mateo, 2014; Egeberg, Gornitzka, & Trondal,
2014; Eibauer, 2012). Hence, providing transparency and
thereby reducing information asymmetry might actually
be beneficial for the Commission in terms of enhancing
its external negotiation effectiveness—i.e. concluding an
international trade agreement, instead of compromising
the Commission’s inter-institutional bargaining power. It
can also explain why the Commission would go beyond
the legally required minimumwhen exchanging informa-
tion with the Parliament, as such engagement fosters
reciprocity (Coremans & Kerremans, 2017).
By adopting a Commission-centred perspective, this
article also addresses two other neglected areas in the
study of transparency and EU decision-making. First,
while a few studies of Commission–Parliament relations
have covered daily interaction patterns between these
two institutions and reasons explaining such patterns,
empirical research on this inter-institutional relationship
is still largely absent (Egeberg et al., 2014; Rosén, 2016).
In addition, most struggles in EU trade policy are about
access to information and inclusion in decision-making
(Ripoll Servent & Busby, 2013). Yet the dominant focus
in EU trade policy research has been on actors’ influence
on the final policy outcome, while the study of proce-
dural rules and norms has generally remained merely a
means to an end. By exploring inter-institutional coordi-
nation procedures between Commission and Parliament
for trade negotiations, this article aims to contribute to
this empirical quest.
Second, this article analyses the qualitative aspect of
transparency policies. It provides insight into the type
of information provided, as well as the manner of pro-
vision and the targeted audience. This is warranted as
the number of published documents does not automat-
ically reflect the actual amount of information available
(Cross, 2014; Curtin & Meijer, 2006). A purely quantita-
tive perspective does not allow for drawing conclusions
on democratic legitimacy resulting from transparency,
as this would assume an ‘automatic link’ between the
amount of information available on the one hand, and le-
gitimacy of decision-making outcomes and public percep-
tion of transparency on the other (Brandsma, 2012; De
Fine Licht, 2014; Naurin, 2007). For instance, in searching
a balance between the need for democratic scrutiny and
need for secrecy, giving ‘MEPs privileged access to docu-
ments [can] alleviate accusations of a democratic deficit
while accommodating the need for secrecy’ (Abazi, 2016;
see also Rosén & Stie, 2017, in this issue). Differentiating
between different types and dimensions of transparency
allows for assessing these types of qualitative changes.
3. Three Dimensions of Transparency
Critique of insufficiently transparent negotiations indi-
cates a lack of information about the ongoing discussions
between negotiating actors (Abazi & Tauschinsky, 2015;
Meijer, 2015). Transparency is therefore defined as ‘the
availability of [regime relevant] information about an ac-
tor that allows other actors to monitor the workings or
performance of the first actor’ (Meijer, 2013; Mitchell,
1998). Regime relevant information also encompasses in-
formation about the process through which a decision is
made. Qualitative changes in the level of transparency
can happen on three dimensions: the width, depth, and
manner of provision of information.
The width of the provided information refers to the
number of people that has access to the information.
It can be conceptualised as a continuum of concentric
circles varying from institutional transparency to public
transparency. In other words, public transparency is un-
derstood as a further stage after widening institutional
transparency. Institutional transparency refers to infor-
mation exchange between institutional actors, whereas
public transparency is conceived in the relationship be-
tween the institutions and external actors (Ostry, 2004).
Institutional and public transparency are linked in the
sense that extending public transparency usually auto-
matically entails extension of institutional transparency:
if information is public, institutional actors can access it
as well. Of course, if the concerned information was al-
ready subject to institutional transparency, there will be
no perceived change on the institutional level after in-
troducing public access. Yet despite this overlap, insti-
tutional and public transparency are qualitatively quite
distinct. Inter-institutional document exchange and in-
teraction patterns will naturally differ from those be-
tween an institution and the broader public, and insti-
tutional transparency will remain more protected and
controllable compared to public transparency. Therefore,
the empirical discussion addresses institutional and pub-
lic transparency separately to allow for a more clear-
cut depiction of the changes in the Commission’s trans-
parency policy. These differences however, do not pre-
clude the possibility of similar patterns in terms of ex-
panding width and depth, and changes in the manner of
provision of information.
The depth of transparency refers to the type of infor-
mation provided. Transparency in existence points to in-
formation about the format of certain practices, whereas
transparency in substance relates to the availability of in-
formation about the content of those practices (Cross &
Bølstad, 2015).5 The former would be achieved by pub-
lishing a notice that a particular meeting took or will
take place, whereas the latterwould require the availabil-
ity of meeting agenda’s or minutes containing informa-
tion about the actual content of that meeting. Increasing
depth of transparency is also reflected in the amount of
detail and degree of political sensitivity that is contained
in the information. The dimension of depth is analysed by
assessingwhich documents aremade available andwhat
kind of written information they contain, as well as the
5 It logically follows that the precondition for requesting and accessing information on the content of the practice is knowing that such information exists
in distributable form. These dimensions have also been referred to as deep and shallow secrecy, respectively (Pozen, 2010).
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extent of information that is provided orally in briefings
and meetings.
Themanner of provision pertains to the way informa-
tion is provided by one actor to other actors. Reactive
transparency is the provision of information in reaction
to a specific request. Proactive transparency comprises
information that is made available regardless of any such
specific demand—and thus on the provider’s own initia-
tive (European Ombudsman, 2015a; Meijer, Curtin, &
Hillebrandt, 2012). Proactive transparency is geared to-
wards enhancing the consumption of information by pro-
viding additional information that goes beyond respond-
ing to individual access to documents requests. Theman-
ner of provision is assessed empirically by looking at
whether the Commission takes the initiative for sharing
documents, organising information briefings, and fore-
seeing room for questions and answers in meetings.
Any shift towards proactive, substantive and/or
widened institutional and public transparency is defined
as an increase in transparency. The following section will
address each of these three dimensions in the case of
the Commission’s transparency policy for the TTIP. The
discussion on institutional transparency only covers the
Commission-Parliament relations, as it is here that the
TTIP has been most transformative. Relations between
the Commission and the Council are not discussed be-
cause stable working relationships were already in place
prior to the TTIP negotiations (Coremans & Kerremans,
2017). The findings rely on interviews with officials from
the relevant institutions, participatory observation by
the author in the secretariat of the INTA Committee, and
document analysis.
4. Results
The Commission as the EU’s external negotiator for trade
agreements is the primary institutional actor responsible
for distributing information on trade negotiations. Tak-
ing instructions from Council (formally) and Parliament
(informally), it is responsible for formulating a common
position and defending it towards the negotiating part-
ner, as well as providing feedback on those external ne-
gotiations afterwards.6 More specifically, this responsi-
bility lies with the DG Trade headed by the Commissioner
for Trade (at the time of writing Ms. Cecilia Malmström,
who succeeded Mr. Karel De Gucht in November 2014).
Decisions about which transparency policy to follow are
made in DG Trade Directorate A (Resources, Informa-
tion and Policy Coordination), in coordination with the
Commissioner’s cabinet (Mungengová, 2016). This sec-
tion will provide an overview of the main changes in the
transparency policy for TTIP on the dimensions of width,
depth and manner of provision of information.
4.1. Public Transparency
At the outset of the negotiations, there was no mention
of making public any negotiation documents produced
in the context of the TTIP negotiations—with the possi-
ble exception of EU position papers (European Commis-
sion, 2013). By spring 2014, a lack of information on the
content of the negotiations fuelled speculation in pub-
lic opinion about what was being negotiated (Agence
Europe, 2014a). By March 2014, DG Trade published a
communication in which it articulated how negotiations
are conducted and which actors are involved in EU-level
decision-making on TTIP (European Commission, 2014a).
This can be classified as a strategy of providing trans-
parency in existence.
In addition to this communication, DG Trade pub-
lished a limited number of negotiation texts online (Euro-
pean Commission, 2014c). Following repeated requests
from the Commission and after an own-initiative inquiry
by the European Ombudsman, the Council finally re-
leased the TTIP negotiating mandate in October 2014—
the first of its kind to be made public while negotiations
were still ongoing (Council of the EU, 2014; European
Ombudsman, 2015b).7 Both initiatives marked the start
of a paradigm shift from a strategy of transparency in ex-
istence early 2014, towards transparency in substance
over the course of the latter half of 2014 and through-
out 2015.
In November 2014, DG Trade formulated a more
precise strategy for the provision of substantive trans-
parency in TTIP negotiations, with the intention of
demystifying misunderstandings about their content
(Agence Europe, 2014b; Mungengová, 2016). This com-
munication introduced a strategy of elaborating trans-
parency in substance and proactive provision of infor-
mation by increasing the number of EU position papers
made publicly available and reviewing the manner of
classification of information. From December 2014, DG
Trade also started publishing lists of all unclassified TTIP
documents it shares with Council and Parliament (Euro-
pean Commission, 2014b, 2015d, 2016b).
In January 2015, DG Trade started publishing legal
texts or ‘textual proposals’, which contained more spe-
cific information regarding wording and binding commit-
ments compared to the previously available EU position
papers (Agence Europe, 2015a). Continued opposition
by several civil society organisations however, indicated
that the move towards substantive transparency did not
fully address the main accusations and concerns of pub-
lic opinion (Agence Europe, 2015b). DG Trade continued
publishing additional factsheets on the content of the
agreement and provided additional online material ex-
plaining EU negotiating positions and approaches (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2015a). DG Trade also organised a
6 The Commission proposes a negotiating mandate, which the Council may then alter according to its own preferences and sensitivities before adopting
the final mandate. While the Parliament does not formally have a role at this stage, it has informal influence through resolutions and inter-institutional
agreements.
7 The TTIP mandate declassification already proved to be a precedent for the Trade in Services Agreement, as these directives were also released while
negotiations were ongoing (Council of the EU, 2015).
Politics and Governance, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 3, Pages 29–39 32
public outreach event in June 2015, and provided a glos-
sary of frequently used terms in policy documents and a
reader’s guide to TTIP negotiation texts (European Com-
mission, 2015e, 2015f, 2015g). Providing these types of
explanatory notes in layman’s terms marks a change in
the quality of the information provided and indicates a
shift from access to documents to enhancing the con-
sumption of already available information (European Par-
liament, 2016a).
The November 2014 Communication already hinted
at the precedential value of TTIP in terms of public trans-
parency (European Commission, 2014b). With the pub-
lication of the ‘Trade for All’ strategy in October 2015,
DG Trade laid the groundwork for extending the TTIP
transparency policy to all future and ongoing trade ne-
gotiations (European Commission, 2015b). Since then,
the new strategy has been implemented mainly via
the DG Trade website by proactively publishing docu-
ments on other ongoing trade agreements like the Eco-
nomic Partnership Agreements, EU–Canada Comprehen-
sive and Economic Trade Agreement, EU–Japan Free
Trade Agreement, and Trade in Services Agreement, to-
gether with a database containing the meetings of the
Trade Commissioner, the Commissioner cabinet mem-
bers and the Director-General of DG Trade (European
Commission, 2016a).
In conclusion, the Commission’s paradigm shift for
public transparency started in 2014. Over the course of
the latter half of 2014 DG Trade moved from its initial
strategy of transparency in existence to a proactive ap-
proach to transparency in substance. It did so by making
EU position papers and negotiation texts available on-
line, without waiting for any specific demand. Through-
out 2015, DG Trade published additional texts in con-
junction with explanatory notes, shifting the quality of
the information from mere access to documents to ac-
cess to information. Instead of waiting for specific access
to documents requests, the Commission’s current trans-
parency policy for trade negotiations relies on increas-
ing the depth of information provided and proactive on-
line publication of a wide array of negotiation texts and
supporting explanatory documents. Since the launch of
the ‘Trade for All’ strategy in October 2015, DG Trade
has been extending this type of proactive, in-depth trans-
parency policy to other trade negotiations as well.
4.2. Institutional Transparency
The TTIP transparency policy has also changed the way
the Commission behaves in its relationship with the
other EU institutions. Since 2006, the Commission has
the sole responsibility for communication with the Par-
liament at the start, during, and at the end of trade ne-
gotiations (European Union, 2006). This complicated the
historically difficult and unstructured communication be-
tween Parliament and Council on trade policy evenmore,
resulting in a very slowly changing mind-set within the
Council regarding communication with Parliament after
the Lisbon Treaty (Parliament official 2, interview, April
2016; Parliament official 4, interview, May 2016).
However, under the Commission’s influence, small
changes were introduced in the Council–Parliament re-
lationship. From 2011 a limited number of INTA mem-
bers was allowed by the Council to consult the final
negotiation directives in secured reading rooms. Other
MEPs only received the draft mandate—a Commission
document—and had to rely on the Commission to pro-
vide an unofficial summary of the changes that the Coun-
cil hadmade in the final, approved directives (Parliament
official 2 and 3, interview, April 2016).8 By openly sup-
porting the Parliament’s request to the Council for the
release of those final directives before the end of nego-
tiations, as well as calling for such a release in its draft
directives for later trade negotiations, the Commission
has sought to position itself as a pro-transparency actor,
shifting the blame for perceived secrecy onto the Council
and member states.
Commission–Parliament relations exist of four main
channels: exchange of documents, monthly INTA Com-
mittee meetings, monitoring groups, and technical brief-
ings. These are supplemented by informal contacts be-
tween administrators from DG Trade and the INTA sec-
retariat, and bilateral contacts between DG Trade spe-
cialised units and political groups and MEP’s offices (Par-
liament official 1, interview, March 2016). The most ob-
vious change since 2013 has been widening the informa-
tion provision from a limited number ofMEPs in the INTA
Committee to all MEPs. Since the commitment made by
previous Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht to consider
specific arrangements for TTIP documents, access to doc-
uments has been extended from a core group of MEPs
in the INTA Committee and US monitoring group to all
MEPs (Council of the EU, 2013). Documents provided by
DG Trade to the Parliament belong to one of three cate-
gories: ‘EU Limited’, ‘EU Restricted’, and ‘consolidated ne-
gotiation texts’, with sensitivity increasing respectively.
By spring 2014, DG Trade e-mailed ‘EU Limited’ docu-
ments to the INTA Committee secretariat, who then dis-
tributed them via e-mail to all INTA Members. Individu-
alised, watermarked paper copies of documents marked
‘EU Restricted’ were initially exclusively available to a
core group of MEPs.9 This core group exists of the INTA
Chair and Vice-Chairs, INTA Group Coordinators, INTA
Standing and Shadow Rapporteurs for the US, and Chairs
and Rapporteurs of other committees involved in the US
monitoring group (European Parliament, 2014a).10 Ac-
cess to these ‘EU Restricted’ documents in a secure read-
ing room, however, was extended to all MEPs from the
8 The 2010 Framework Agreement confirmed the existing practice established by the 1995 Code of Conduct that the Commission would inform Parlia-
ment of the draft recommendations for the negotiating directives.
9 Two individualised and watermarked paper copies were also sent to the INTA Secretariat.
10 This arrangement applies exclusively to the US monitoring group (see below).
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beginning of 2015. ‘Consolidated negotiation texts’ were
available only to the core group of MEPs (European Com-
mission, 2014b; European Parliament, 2015a; 2015d).
At the end of 2015 new arrangements for access to
TTIP documents were put in place (European Parliament,
2015f; Malmström, 2015). These operational arrange-
ments extended access of all documents to allMEPs,with
rules varying between classifications (European Parlia-
ment, 2015f). All MEPs have access to individualized and
watermarked copies of ‘EU Limited’ documents via an on-
line system (‘SharePoint’), with possibility to print.11 This
IT tool is considered a pilot project for other negotia-
tions as well, however at the time of writing it is used
for TTIP documents only (Parliament official 2, interview,
April 2016).12 Provisions for ‘EURestricted’ remained the
same. Finally, all MEPs got access to ‘consolidated nego-
tiation texts’ in a secure reading room. By spring 2016,
access to all documents was further extended to Mem-
bers of national parliaments in reading rooms in Mem-
ber State capitals—extending the width of transparency
even further (European Commission, 2015c; European
Parliament, 2015c, 2015d, 2016b).
Hence, access to TTIP documents has been extended
from a select number of INTA Members to all MEPs
and even national parliamentarians. The ‘Trade for all’
strategy now envisages extending these practices for
similar negotiations as well.13 As these documents are
TPC documents, the Commission also uses this channel
of transparency to communicate information from its
discussions with the Council to Parliament. The quasi-
automatic nature in which the document transfer takes
place, indicates the proactive strategy of the Commis-
sion’s information provision towards the Parliament. The
‘EU Restricted’ category has seen the largest increase, in-
dicating thatmoreMEPs have also gotten access tomuch
more in-depth, sensitive information (Figure 1).
DG Trade has also shifted its efforts to enhance
both the depth and the width of information exchange
through the severalmeeting formats of the INTA Commit-
tee, including the monthly INTA meetings, US monitor-
ing group, technical briefings, and informal briefingmeet-
ings between DG Trade and the INTA secretariat. These
briefing meetings between INTA administrators and DG
Trade unit for Resources, Information and Policy Coordi-
nation (Directorate A) take place before each INTA meet-
ing, in addition to continuous e-mail and telephone con-
tact. Since the start of the 8th Parliamentary term (July
2014), high-level Commission representatives have spo-
ken about TTIP in INTA Committee nine times.14 Yet, the
bulk of Commission-Parliament interaction on TTIP has
taken place informally. The full agenda and strict meet-
ing schedule of the monthly INTA Committee meetings
do not allow the Commission to fulfil its Treaty obligation
to immediately and fully inform the Parliament (Commis-
sion official 4, interview, January 2016).
This informal interaction takes place in monitoring
groups and technical briefings. Monitoring groups with
specific geographical orientations were created in INTA
in June 2011 (European Parliament, 2011).15 Members
are the Standing Rapporteur—an INTA Member from
the political group that was allocated the respective re-
gion through the D’Hondt method—and Shadow Stand-
ing Rapporteurs for the remaining political groups (Par-
liament official 3, interview, April 2016; Parliament offi-
Total
Public
Limited
Restricted
2013
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
N
um
be
r 
of
 d
oc
um
en
ts
2014 2015 2016
Figure 1. Number of TPC documents on TTIP, received by INTA. Source: Author’s interview data.
11 INTA Secretariat staff and Group advisors have access to ‘EU Limited’ documents on a need-to-know basis. The limits of such ‘need-to-know’ were
articulated in the document setting out the operational arrangements (European Parliament, 2015f; Malmström, 2015).
12 Documents for other trade negotiations go through INTA secretariat and are distributed by e-mail to interested INTA members (Parliament official 2,
interview, April 2016).
13 Interestingly, all documents—even consolidated texts—relating to the Trade in Services Agreement are sent by the INTA secretariat to interested INTA
MEPs via e-mail (Parliament official 3, interview, April 2016).
14 Current Trade Commissioner Malmström has been in the INTA Committee to talk about TTIP five times and current TTIP chief negotiator Bercero three
times.
15 The current rules are set out in the INTA General Principles regarding Standing Rapporteurs and Monitoring Groups for Negotiations and Implementa-
tion of International Trade Agreements (European Parliament, 2015e).
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cial 4, interview, May 2016; see also Coremans & Meiss-
ner, 2017; European Parliament, 2017).16 During moni-
toring group meetings DG Trade briefs the MEPs of the
latest developments in negotiations and puts a lot of ef-
fort in providing detailed explanations of technical as-
pects. This is then followed by questions fromMEPs and
direct discussion on issues they might bring up. The in-
camera quality ofmonitoring groups is considered impor-
tant for exchanging confidential information, as the Com-
mission uses monitoring groups for passing political mes-
sages on the state of play in external negotiations (Parlia-
ment official 2 and 3, interview, April 2016; Parliament
official 4, interview, May 2016).
Following the regional organisation, the monitoring
group for the US covers TTIP. Special arrangements are
in place when the US monitoring group meets on TTIP.
Towards the end of 2013, the INTA Committee decided
to extend invitations for TTIP meetings to the Chair and
Standing Rapporteurs of other opinion-giving Commit-
tees. This is currently a unique feature in INTA.17 During
the electoral transition periodmid-2014, special arrange-
mentsweremade for theUSmonitoring group, to ensure
continuity of the information exchange (European Par-
liament, 2014b). The EU Chief negotiator for TTIP briefs
MEPs before and after each negotiation round in the US
monitoring group. The pre-round briefing in the US mon-
itoring group allows MEPs to send clear messages to the
TTIP chief negotiator in DG Trade andmakes theUSmoni-
toring groupmeetingsmore structured and detailed (Par-
liament official 4, interview, May 2016). This also means
the US monitoring group meets more often than others,
as those only meet once after negotiation rounds (Com-
mission official 1, interview, November 2015). With 10
meetings and an average of 22 MEPs attending in 2015,
compared to an average of 3 meetings and 3 MEPs at-
tending for all other monitoring groups, the US monitor-
ing group was by far the most popular monitoring group
that year (Parliament official 4, interview, May 2016).
In addition to monitoring groups, DG Trade can ask
the INTA secretariat to organise technical briefings with
the members of the monitoring group (Commission of-
ficial 1, interview, November 2015). These briefings go
into depth about technical issues of a trade agreement.
MEPs (or often their assistants in this case), political
group advisors, and INTA secretariat administrators can
ask questions to the DG Trade directly, which makes
these technical briefings yet another way for DG Trade to
provide in-depth information about ongoing trade nego-
tiations (Commission official 4, interview, January 2016;
Parliament official 3, interview, April 2016; Parliament
official 4, interview, May 2016). On TTIP, 35 monitoring
groups and 7 technical briefings took place from 2013 to
2016 (Parliament official 4, interview, May 2016).
All informal meeting formats discussed above,
strengthen the MEP’s and INTA staff’s understanding
of ongoing negotiations. DG Trade uses the meetings
to give supplementary information, clarification and an-
swers to questions that may have arisen after consulting
negotiation documents. In addition, the informal nature
of these exchanges also allows for orally communicating
information that is not considered suitable to provide in
written form. Hence, the informal communication prac-
tices between DG Trade and INTA serve to deepen the
transparency in substance, compared to written commu-
nication and access to documents only. Extending the in-
vitation to attend the USmonitoring group toMEPs from
other Committees—when covering TTIPmatters—is also
an indication of widening the institutional transparency
beyond expanding institutional access to documents.
4.3. Summarising the Findings
The Commission’s paradigm shift for public transparency
started in 2014 when DG Trade moved from its initial
strategy of transparency in existence to a proactive ap-
proach to transparency in substance. Throughout 2015,
the quality of the information shifted from access to
documents to access to information. Instead of waiting
for specific access to documents requests, the Commis-
sion’s current transparency policy for trade negotiations
relies on increasing the depth of information provided
and proactive online publication of a wide array of nego-
tiation texts and supporting explanatory documents (Ta-
ble 1). The ‘Trade for All’ strategy sets the scene for a
spill-over of these changes to other trade negotiations.
The Commission has also shifted to a more proac-
tive and in-depth communication strategy with the Par-
liament, mainly by extending its informal engagement
with MEPs of the INTA Committee and sharing more in-
depth information about the substance of the TTIP agree-
ment. By extending access to documents from a lim-
ited number of INTA Members to all MEPs, the institu-
tional width of transparency has increased significantly
(Table 1). Moving towards more transparency on these
three dimensions has fostered a more stable working
relationship between Commission and Parliament, en-
hanced the quality of exchanges in the INTA Committee
and emphasised the role of the Commission as an inter-
locutor between Council and Parliament while position-
ing the transparency-minded Commission against a se-
cretive Council.
5. Conclusion
This article has sought to explain how and why the
Commission has developed a transparency policy for
TTIP that goes beyond the legal minimum imposed by
Treaty and case law or formal requirements enacted in
institutional agreements. Assessing transparency from
the supply-side revealed that shifting from a trans-
16 In addition, access is granted to political group advisers of INTA, assistants of INTA Members and substitutes, the INTA secretariat, the Legal Service,
and the Policy Department. The Chair of the relevant Parliamentary Delegation for relations with the respective country is also invited.
17 At the time of writing, discussions to extend this practice to the Trade in Services Agreement monitoring group were ongoing.
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Table 1. Effect of TTIP on the three dimensions of transparency. Source: Author’s own data.
Public transparency Institutional transparency
Depth Communications on EU decision-making Final negotiation directives
processes Increased provision of ‘EU restricted’ documents
Lists of institutional documents Oral information through informal monitoring
EU position papers groups, technical briefings, staff-level meetings
Negotiation and legal texts
Width Online public repositories Access to all types of documents for all MEPs
Social media (and national MPs)
Glossary and reader’s guide Extended number of participants in US
Explanatory texts monitoring group
Factsheets
Manner of provision From individual access to documents to: Automated transfer of TPC documents through
• Automatic online publications dedicated IT systems
• Public outreach events Organisation of informal communication channels
parency policy based on access to documents to one
fostering consumption of information is beneficial for
the Commission as well. By reducing information asym-
metry, the Commission enhances its external nego-
tiation effectiveness—i.e. concluding an international
trade agreement, rather than compromising its inter-
institutional bargaining power.
Throughout the course of the TTIP negotiations the
Commission has introduced a public transparency pol-
icy aimed at improving consumption of information.
The proactive nature of DG Trade’s transparency policy
for TTIP—going beyond individual access to document
requests—aids the Commission’s public profiling as a
transparent actor as opposed to a secretive Council. This
became particularly clear in its steady pressure on the
Council to release the negotiation mandates for trade
agreements, as well as the repeated statements by Com-
missioner Malmström urging Member States to take up
responsibility in communication with the European pub-
lic. The release of the negotiation mandate also shows
how institutional and public transparency are linked:
with the public availability of the negotiation mandate
for TTIP, the institutional transparency also widened as
MEPs that did not have access to those texts before could
now access them freely.
On the inter-institutional level, the Commission has
taken on the role of interlocutor to facilitate the weak
link between Council and Parliament in trade policy, and
is investing substantial resources in developing a stable
base for information exchange with the Parliament. By
automatically transferring TPC documents to the INTA
Committee, extending the practice of informal technical
meetings (as theywere in placewith the Council) to inter-
actions with INTA, as well as supporting the Parliament’s
demands for releasing negotiation directives, the Com-
mission has shifted from a reactive to a proactive actor in
transparency. By supplementing expanded access to doc-
uments with in-depth explanations of current issues in
the monitoring groups and technical briefings, the Com-
mission has developed a transparency policy geared to-
wards consumption of information.
In terms of democratisation and legitimacy concerns,
the Commission’s focus on the consumption of informa-
tion may reduce the perceived democratic deficit in EU
trade policy: enhancing the quality of the information—
compared to a quantitative increase in the number of
documents only—strengthens the link between trans-
parency and legitimacy of decision-making outcomes. By
focusing in particular on institutional transparency, this
link can be strengthened while at the same time shield-
ing internal decision-making processes. Yet questions re-
main as to the selection of information that is proactively
provided and the choice ofmeans throughwhich this pro-
vision takes place: what determines which documents
are subject to public or institutional transparency, and
which media or institutional channels are used to com-
municate the information? For instance, the rise in the
number of restricted documents available to the Parlia-
ment may indicate an attempt to balance the extent of
the reduction of information asymmetry with protecting
a necessary level of confidentiality. In other words, how
does the Commission balance the benefits and costs of
lowering institutional information asymmetries?
This article has offered an alternative view of the rea-
soning behind the increasing transparency of EU trade
policy by shifting the implicit conceptualisation of the
Commission-on-the-defensive, to one of a proactive sup-
plier of transparency—even in absence of a specific de-
mand. Throughout the TTIP negotiations the Commis-
sion has gone beyond individual access to documents
requests and is proactively providing in-depth trans-
parency to a broader public and institutional audience.
This shift, as well as the importance placed by DG Trade
on communication with the Parliament’s INTA Commit-
tee, are indications of the benefits related to lowering in-
formation asymmetry for the Commission as an effective
external negotiator.
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